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1 Introduction 
The secret keys manipulated by cryptographic circuits can be extracted using fault 
injections associated with differential cryptanalysis techniques [1]. Such faults can be 
induced by different means such as lasers, voltage glitches, electromagnetic 
perturbations or clock skews. Several counter-measures have been proposed such 
as random delay insertions, circuit duplications or error correcting codes. In this 
paper, we focus on an AES chip in which the circuit duplication principle has been 
implemented to detect fault injection. We show that faults based on clock set-up time 
violations can nevertheless be used to defeat the implemented counter-measure. 
2 Circuit description 
The Tamper-Resistant (TR) AES chip is an ASIC implementation of a secure version 
of the 128-bit-key AES [2] algorithm as described in [7]. The chip is implemented in 
HCMOS9gp 130nm STM technology and works at 50 MHz. The algorithm is an 
iterative one consisting of rounds where the input data and intermediate values are 
represented as 4x4 matrices of bytes. Each round, which is executed in 1 clock 
cycle, uses a different round-key which is iteratively derived from the input secret key. 
The security strategy used is to detect induced errors and to spread them so that the 
resulted erroneous cipher-text can no longer be used for differential cryptanalysis [3]. 
 
 
Fig. 1: TR- AES block diagram   Fig. 2: Fault generated on one path 
           with detection and propagation 
 
Error detection is achieved by duplicating the data paths of the RND_EXE and 
KEY_EXPANDER blocks in a dual manner (as shown in Fig. 1), thus creating an 
‘original data path’ working on the input message and key and a ‘dual data path’ 
working on complemented values of the input message and key. The error detection 
is implemented in the SUB-BYTES module (the upper part of Fig. 2) whereby an 
Error Detection Matrix (EDM) is derived by comparing both data paths. Then, an 
Error Propagation Matrix (EPM) is built as shown in Fig. 3 before being injected on 
the data paths to obtain a spreading of the errors (the grey bytes in Fig. 2). 
 
 
 
Fig. 3: Error Matrix calculation            Fig. 4: Picture of the TR-AES chip 
 
Further diffusion of the errors is achieved by cross-changing wires between the 
original and the dual data paths in the SHIFT_ROWS module. Fig. 2 shows what 
happens when an error is generated on one of the data paths at the start of the last 
round: the resulting cipher-text has too many faulty bytes to be exploited by any 
differential cryptanalysis technique. The resistance of this TR-AES chip against side-
channel (due to the dual representations) and local laser fault (due to the error 
propagation mechanism) attacks is demonstrated in [7]. 
3 The attack scenario 
Since the TR-AES chip works with an external clock, we chose to stress-test the 
circuit using the clock set-up time violation fault injection technique described in [4]: 
we decrease the clock period at a targeted cycle in order to corrupt the execution of 
one particular round of the AES. This faulty clock is generated using the embedded 
Delay Locked Loop (DLL) of a Xilinx Virtex 5 FPGA (Fig. 5). 
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Fig. 5: Faulty Clock Signal Generation 
 
Two clocks (clkd1 and clkd2) with programmable skews are generated from the 
original 50MHz clock (clk) and the resulting faulty clock is a combination of clkd2’s 
rising edge and clkd1’s falling edge. The generated clock’s skew ∆T varies from 0 to 
∆Tmax=9804ps by steps of δT=76ps (the DLL’s smallest elementary delay). Hence, 
the period of the faulty clock cycle varies between 20ns and 10.196ns. In [4], the 
authors generated single bit faults on a non-secure FPGA implementation of the AES 
by monitoring the duration of the skew.  
 
In order to exploit the generation of single bit faults on an AES, we used two 
differential fault cryptanalysis techniques where bytes of the 10th round-key can be 
retrieved. In the first one, described by Giraud [5], the attacker has to inject only one 
bit error at the end of the 9th (one before last) round of the AES. Then by using the 
expected cipher-text and the corrupted one, bits of the secret keys can be found. For 
a given byte, with 3 corrupted cipher-texts, the corresponding sub-key byte is found 
with a probability of 99%. The second technique is given by Piret & Quisquater in [6]. 
There, a single bit fault has to be injected at the end of the 8th round of the AES such 
that the correct cipher-text and the faulty one differ by four bytes (one column). With 
two faulty cipher-texts corrupted on the same column, there are 97% chances of 
retrieving the corresponding column’s secret round-key. 
 
For those two techniques to work on the TR-AES, we need to ‘bypass’ the error 
detection. To achieve this, the same error is generated on the ‘original’ and the ‘dual’ 
data paths as shown in Fig. 6. Consequently the error matrix is null, the error is not 
detected and at the end of the round, only one byte is corrupted. A fault is hence 
generated and yet not detected by the counter-measure. 
 
  
Fig. 6: Faults generated on both paths            Fig. 7: Attack scheme for Giraud’s or  
without detection nor propagation            Piret-Quisquater’s attacks 
 
We used the DLL-based clock set-up time violation board to inject the desired faults. 
The attack scenario used is given in Fig. 7: for each of the different N random 
messages M, the skew on a ‘specific’ clock cycle (corresponding to a round) is 
increased until the ‘attack condition’ is satisfied. In the case of Giraud’s attack, the 
clock skew is inserted during the 9th round and the ‘attack condition’ corresponds to 
having a faulty cipher-text with only one corrupted byte. Out of N=60000 executions, 
done in 36 hours, 235 cipher-texts had one faulty byte and among these 6 different 
bytes locations were impacted. This approach revealed bytes 5, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the 
AES 10th round-key and reduced to 3 the number of possibilities for the 1st one. For 
the Piret-Quisquater’s attack, the skew is inserted during the 8th round and the ‘attack 
condition’ corresponds to having an entire column of the cipher-text impacted. We 
played 20000 scenarios (in 13 hours), 9 of which induced four-byte errors on a 
column but only six were exploitable for the attack. We hence found bytes 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15 and 16 of the 10th round-key. By combining the results from 
both attacks we got 13 bytes of the 10th round-key and had only 3 possibilities for a 
14th one. The remaining round-key bits could then be found using 3×28×28 brute force 
searches. With the 10th round-key, the original secret key can be calculated by 
executing the iterative round-key derivation algorithm in the reverse order. 
4 Conclusion 
The TR-AES chip is a secure cryptographic circuit having a complemented 
duplicated implementation designed to resist to fault attacks and to reduce the effect 
of side channel information leakage [7]. Using clock set-up time violations, we 
showed that such a counter-measure is not enough to protect against fault injections. 
With Giraud’s and Piret-Quisquater’s techniques, 13 out of 16 secret key bytes were 
retrieved in less than 40 hours. It is, to our best knowledge, the first reported practical 
results on an AES ASIC chip showing that fault detection based on duplication can 
be defeated using low cost techniques. This counter-measure was designed to resist 
to a laser beam fault injection [7], which has a local effect, as opposed to a stress 
induced by a clock glitch which has a global effect on both data paths. In the light of 
the data retrieved from the fault attacks described in this paper, we believe that 
combined side-channel and fault attacks can be carried on such a design.  
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